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Abstract 
 
Technologies that deploy algorithmic calculation are becoming ubiquitous to the 
homeland securitization of the war on terror. From the surveillance networks of the 
city subway to the biometric identifiers of new forms of border control, the 
possibility to identify „association rules‟ between people, places, objects and events 
has brought the logic of pre-emption into the most mundane and prosaic spaces. 
Yet, it is not the case that the turn to algorithmic calculation simply militarizes 
society, nor even that we are witnessing strictly a commercialization of security. 
Rather, algorithmic war is one form of Foucault‟s sense of a “continuation of war by 
other means”, where the war-like architectures of self/other, here/there, safe/risky, 
normal/suspicious are played out in the politics of daily life. This paper explores the 
situated interplay of algorithmic practices across commercial, security, and military 
spheres, revealing the violent geographies that are concealed in the glossy techno-
science of algorithmic calculation.  
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Algorithmic War: Everyday Geographies of the War on Terror 
 
In the search for terrorists and terrorist cells, we are employing predictive 
technology that was previously utilized by the business community. 
(US Department of Justice 2002). 
 
The final decision can come only from war. 
(Foucault 2003 [1976]: 16). 
 
In 2005, the then US Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, and the under 
Secretary Asa Hutchinson, resigned their government positions and established 
businesses supplying expert systems in the burgeoning homeland security market. Ridge, 
having taken a directorship of Savi Technology, a radio frequency identification (RFID) 
technology company, founded Ridge Global LLC, a consulting firm specializing in 
domestic security and crisis risk management (New York Times 2006: 34). By 2006, 
when RFID had become a primary security technology proposed for passports, visas, and 
transportation systems, Ridge had been appointed government applications consultant for 
Deloitte and Touche‟s RFID services. Hutchinson, for his part, established the 
eponymous Hutchinson Group, a homeland security consulting company, and held stocks 
in Fortress America Acquisition Corp, a company trading in the public procurement of 
private security technologies.  
 
As key figures in an administration that authorized algorithmic computing applications, 
biometrics, risk management systems and surveillance technologies to help fight the „war 
on terror‟, their move to the private commercial world illustrates an emerging geography 
of securitization in everyday life. From the remote sensing of bodies on a railway 
platform, to the securing of identity via biometric algorithms, or the profiling of risk at 
the airport, the practices of the war on terror exceed any clear distinction between 
military/civil/commercial spheres. It is not that algorithmic techniques have their origins 
strictly in the military domain (though as we will see many of them do), nor that society 
is strictly undergoing renewed militarization, but that security practices oscillate back and 
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forth across different domains. There is, as William Connolly describes it, an emerging 
“resonance” between security activities: 
 
Airport surveillance, internet filters, passport tracking devices, legal detention 
without criminal charges, security internment camps, secret trials, “free speech 
zones”, DNA profiles, border walls and fences, erosion of the line between 
internal security and external military action – these security activities resonate 
together, engendering a national security machine that pushes numerous issues 
outside the range of legitimate dissent and mobilizes the populace to support new 
security and surveillance practices against underspecified enemies. 
(Connolly 2005: 54). 
 
Neither a militarization of society, nor even a commercialization of security, then, what 
we are seeing is a stitching together of the mundane and prosaic calculations of business, 
the security decisions authorized by the state, and the mobilized vigilance of a fearful 
public. It is important to stress here that questioning the logic of militarization is not to 
underplay the acute violence inherent to this different kind of war. What I call here 
„algorithmic war‟ is one specific appearance of Foucault‟s Clausewitzian inversion – the 
“continuation of war by other means”, its appeal to technology and expertise rendering 
the violent force of war somewhat ordinary and invisible (1976/2003: 16). “The role of 
political power”, writes Foucault, “is perpetually to use a sort of silent war to reinscribe 
the relationship of force, and to reinscribe it in institutions, economic inequalities, 
language, and even the bodies of individuals” (16-17). Understood in this way, the 
political practices of homeland security – what Derek Gregory and Alan Pred call “expert 
solutions” (2007: 1) – are actually sanctioning and reproducing the war-like relations of 
power seen in the overtly militarized spaces of Afghanistan and Iraq. They target 
individual bodies, designate communities as dangerous or risky, delineate safe zones 
from targeted locations, invoke the pre-emptive strike on the city streets.  
 
Algorithmic security is war-like, then, not primarily because it brings military force into 
closer proximity with our daily commute or airport check-in queue (though of course it 
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does do this), but because it functions through a war-like architecture. It deploys an 
“architecture of enmity”, a drawing of the lines between self/other; us/them; safe/risky; 
inside/outside, that makes going to war possible (Shapiro 1997). Though political 
geography has given critical attention to the performativity of the violent imagination of 
threat, this has most commonly focused on spaces where the presence of war is visceral 
and visible – where uniformed military personnel are present of the city streets (Katz 
2007); when urban spaces are the targeted sites of war (Graham 2004); or in the tangible 
violences of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay (Minca 2005). In this paper, I explore the 
less visible spaces where the architecture of enmity is present in the form of algorithmic 
war. In the first section, I trace an extended example of algorithmic calculations deployed 
to identify „hidden‟ associations between people, groups, behaviours and transactions. 
Initially developed to allow commercial retail players to take strategic decisions in an 
uncertain future marketplace, algorithmic „rules of association‟ have become the basis for 
pre-emptive state security decisions. In the second section, I focus on the spatiality of 
algorithmic war, arguing that it has a geography of locatability. Discussing the homeland 
security applications of radio frequency identification (RFID) technologies, I suggest that 
the dispersed and diffuse locations of the supply chain (offshore, export processing, 
control from a distance) are incorporated into state border controls (RFID passports and 
visas, tracking technologies in public space). Algorithmic war appears to make it possible 
for the imagination of an open global economy of mobile people, objects and monies, to 
be reconciled with the post 9/11 rendering of a securitized nation-state.  
 
 
Probability/Security: Algorithms at the Checkout and in the Subway 
 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the homeland face of the war on terror identified an 
enemy whose probable future actions were already visible in the traces of life left in 
existing data. Giving evidence at a US Congressional hearing only five months after 9/11, 
IBM‟s federal business manager testified that “in this war, our enemies are hiding in open 
and available information across a spectrum of databases” (Intelligent Enterprise 2002: 
8). Technology consultants and IT providers such as IBM have made the generation of 
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probabilistic association rules the forefront of homeland security practices. The idea is 
that locating regularities in large and disparate patterns of data can enable associations to 
be established between apparently „suspicious‟ people, places, financial transactions, 
cargo shipments and so on (Amoore and de Goede 2005; Ericson 2007). Rules of 
association are produced by algorithms – models or “decision trees” for a calculation 
(Quinlan 1986). In effect, algorithms appear to make it possible to translate probable 
associations between people or objects into actionable security decisions. In 2003, for 
example, a US joint inquiry concluded that “on September 11, enough relevant data was 
resident in existing databases”, so that “had the dots been connected”, the events could 
have been “exposed and stopped” (2003: 14). It is precisely this „connecting of dots‟ that 
is the work of the algorithm. By connecting the dots of probabilistic associations, the 
algorithm becomes a means of foreseeing or anticipating a course of events yet to take 
place: 
 
If we learned anything from September 11 2001, it is that we need to be better at 
connecting the dots of terrorist-related information. After September 11, we used 
credit card and telephone records to identify those linked with the hijackers. But 
wouldn‟t it be better to identify such connections before a hijacker boards a plane? 
(US Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff 2006). 
 
The algorithm appears to make possible the conversion of ex post facto evidence in the 
war on terror into a judgement made in advance of the event. The significant point here is 
that probabilistic knowledge, based on the databased residue of daily life, becomes a 
means of securitization. As the US Inspector General concluded in his survey of 
government applications of algorithmic techniques, “association does not imply a direct 
causal connection”, but instead it “uncovers, interprets and displays relationships between 
persons, places and events” (Department of Homeland Security 2006: 10). It is the 
specific visualization of threat, then, that marks out the algorithm as a distinctive mode of 
calculation – to be displayed on the screens of border guards, stored on subway travel 
cards, shared between multiple public and private agencies. In this sense, the algorithm 
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produces a screened geography of suspicion, on the basis of which „other‟ people are 
intercepted, detained, stopped and searched (Amoore 2007). 
 
How has it become possible, then, for the algorithmic rules of association to become the 
basis for everyday securitization in the war on terror? In one sense the algorithmic mining 
of data on the population within the war on terror is but one specific turn in a long history 
of incorporating uncertainty into calculations via statistics, what Ian Hacking (1990) has 
called the “taming of chance”. Yet, it is in the more prosaic recent histories of 
probabilistic knowledge in the commercial sphere that algorithmic logics have really 
begun to define the management of uncertain futures of many kinds – from flood risk in 
the insurance industry to catastrophe risk in the financial markets (Baker 2002). One 
particular resonance between the mathematical sciences and commercial worlds is 
especially worthy of discussion for its subsequent role in processes of securitization. In 
the summer of 1992, IBM research fellow Rakesh Agrawal met for lunch with a senior 
executive of UK retailers Marks & Spencer (M&S). Working on mathematical models for 
locating associations between items in “accumulated data” at the IBM-Almaden research 
centre, Agrawal proposed that M&S‟s vast data on daily transactions could be used to 
take strategic corporate decisions. The research paper that resulted from the IBM-M&S 
meeting, and from subsequent work with US retailer Wal-Mart, has become the world‟s 
most cited work on commercial algorithmic techniques for data mining (Agrawal, 
Imielinski and Swami 1993). 
 
Let us pause here and briefly reflect on the logic of Agrawal‟s algorithmic model. 
“Consider a supermarket with a large collection of items”, he writes, “typical business 
decisions might include what to put on sale, how to design coupons, how to place 
merchandise on shelves in order to maximize profit” (Agrawal, Imielinski and Swami 
1993: 207). Progress in bar-code technology, the research finds, has made it possible to 
screen transactions “for association rules between sets of items” and “to present an 
efficient algorithm for that purpose” (1993: 207). Agrawal‟s examples of commercial 
questions that the algorithm could model include such prosaic queries as: What pattern of 
purchases is associated with Diet Coke?; What pattern of items has to be sold with 
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sausages in order for it to be likely that mustard will also be sold? What proportion of 
transactions that include bread and butter also include milk? The deployment of 
algorithmic calculations in this context signals an important move – from the effort to 
predict future trends on the basis of fixed statistical data to a means of pre-empting the 
future, drawing probable futures into imminent and immediate commercial decision. 
 
The IBM work on association rules in the mathematical and computer sciences, though it 
achieved ubiquity by „connecting the dots‟ in prosaic settings and everyday transactions, 
significantly established a way of thinking about taking security decisions in the face of 
an uncertain future. By 2004, Agrawal and his IBM team were leading the export of 
commercial algorithmic techniques to the security sphere, presenting the possibilities of 
association rules for the “mathematical sciences role in homeland security” (BMSA 
2004). The promise that algorithmic calculations held out to the commercial authorities 
of the 1990s – to enable surveillance from a distance, to make market judgements in 
advance, to generate patterns of normal and atypical consumer behaviour – is now being 
re-made in the context of state security desires. At the time of writing IBM currently have 
the software contracts for the Heathrow airport „MiSense‟ biometrics system, the UK e-
borders „Iris‟ and „Semaphore‟ trials, and the US biometric borders programme (DHS 
2005; Computing 2004; 1). As the logics of commercial data mining cross into security 
spheres, association rules become a form of „guilt by association‟, within which risky 
bodies, transactions, mobilities are designated and identified.  
 
The decisions taken on the back of algorithmic calculations – detention at international 
borders (Sparke 2006), freezing of financial assets and targeting of migrant remittances 
(de Goede 2003; Aitken 2006), interception of cargo at ports (Chalfin 2004) – conceal 
political difficulty, even discrimination and violence, within an apparently neutral and 
glossy techno-science. Thus, for example, the algorithmic technologies of the US VISIT 
„smart borders‟ programme, promise to make the “border guard the last line of defense, 
not the first, in identifying potential threats” (Accenture digital forum 2004: 4; see 
Amoore 2006). Because the identification of risk is assumed to be already present within 
the calculation, the border guard is somehow taken off the „front line‟. The screened 
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appearance of a security threat, then, is always already calculated by the algorithmic 
performance of association rules – was the ticket paid in cash?; what is the past pattern of 
travel?; is this a frequent flier?; what in-flight meal was ordered?
1
 The risk flag that 
appears on the border guard‟s screen is the result of a calculation, itself made on the basis 
of prior judgments about norm and deviation from norm. 
 
Of course, in one sense there is nothing at all novel in the co-authorization of security 
decisions by the mathematical and computing sciences, the military and the state 
(Edwards 1996; Light 2003; Martin 2003). Indeed, a reading of Jenny Edkins‟ study of 
the physicists Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr suggests historical parallels between 
the “uncertainty principle in physics”, the “cosmology that made the atomic bomb 
possible”, and the “interpretation of human actions” (2003b: 363/369). Put simply, the 
rejection of causality by quantum physics (embodied also in Agrawal‟s non-causal 
associations) resonates with the science that makes the absolute violence of the atomic 
bomb possible, as well as with the idea of uncertainty in the social world. Taking Edkins‟ 
argument to our concern here – the deployment of algorithms in everyday securitization – 
we can point to a coalescence between indeterminacy in the physical sciences, the 
emergence of virtual and „network‟ warfare, and the rise of inference and suspicion in the 
security decision. What is novel in the contemporary moves to algorithmic war, then, is 
the specific form that the aligning of science, commerce, military and the state is taking.   
 
In the emerging geography of algorithmic war, the relationships between science, 
expertise and decision are radically rearticulated so that distinctions between “science” 
and “non-science”, “expert” and “inexpert” knowledge become more malleable. It is not 
strictly the case, then, as Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle have it, that where “scientific 
data on risk is absent” there is a turn to “non-scientific forms of knowledge that are 
intuitive, emotional, aesthetic, moral, and speculative” (2004: 138). Instead, on the one 
hand, scientific data begins to incorporate the emotional, affective and speculative 
domains while, on the other, knowledges considered to be “non-scientific” are authorized 
as science. Data-led algorithms that model and track the movement of bodies or objects 
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through space now coalesce with intuitive, speculative and inferential knowledges that 
imagine future scenarios.  
 
Consider, by way of example, the multiple interacting forms of algorithmic knowledge 
that are emerging in the transitory spaces of the subway. Surveillance cameras, equipped 
with facial and gait recognition technologies, track „atypical‟ movements such as 
repeated traversals of a platform (Hale 2005); „smart‟ travel payment cards store journey 
data and identify anomalies; and poster displays urge the public “if you suspect it, report 
it”.2 The calculations of the algorithm appear to translate the observation of uncertain and 
contingent human life into something with the credibility of scientific judgement. The 
UK‟s Metropolitan Police public vigilance campaigns, for example, use algorithms on the 
screens of „terror hotline‟ call centres, ascribing a level of scientific and technical 
certitude to the reported suspicions of the „out of the ordinary‟.3 The specific deployment 
of scientific knowledge, then, incorporates the affective domain, rendering fears and 
anxieties a means of anticipating the future. “The precautionary principle”, writes 
François Ewald, “presupposes a new relationship with science and with knowledge”, one 
which “invites one to anticipate what one does not yet know, to take into account 
doubtful hypotheses and simple suspicions” (2002: 288). Algorithmic security 
technologies allow the embracing of the precautionary principle in just this way, inviting 
anticipatory actions and making scientific and certain what would otherwise be mere 
uncertain doubts or suspicions.  
 
If algorithmic techniques are concerned with anticipating an uncertain future, then the 
logic of algorithmic war is one of identifying norm and multiple deviations from the 
norm. To be clear, this is not the norm that is familiar to studies of disciplinary society. 
As Foucault explains, “disciplinary normalization posits a model and tries to get people, 
movements, and actions to conform to this model [the norm]” (2007: 57). In the security 
apparatus, by contrast, we find “exactly the opposite of the disciplines”, where we have 
“a plotting of different curves of normality… the interplay of differential normalities” 
(63). Understood in this way, the algorithm becomes a very specific modality of the 
“imaginative geography” of the war on terror. It plays it part in making possible the 
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interplay of differential normalities – not forever settling out normal and abnormal, 
permitted and prohibited, but allowing degrees of normality.  
 
Citing international relations scholar Michael Shapiro, Derek Gregory argues that 
“geography is inextricably linked to the architecture of enmity”, to the overlapping 
practices through which “collectivities locate themselves in the world and thus how they 
practice the meanings of Self and Other that provide the conditions of possibility for 
regarding others as threats or antagonists” (2004: 20). Yet, Gregory‟s “spiraling 
networks” do not fully push the limits of Shapiro‟s architecture because they return the 
geopolitics of violence to the disciplinary norms of battlefield spaces, obscuring the 
subtle differential violences of the “surveillance network” of the “end-of-violence 
organization” that Shapiro later depicts (2004: 121). In the name of homeland security 
(the end of violence), algorithmic war reinscribes the imaginative geography of the 
deviant, atypical, abnormal „other‟ inside the spaces of daily life. The figure of enmity to 
be feared and intercepted need not only dwell in a represented outside in the geographies 
of Iraq or Afghanistan, for the outside can be inside – in the body of the migrant worker 
(differentially normal in the space of the economy and abnormal in the spaces of 
immigration), the young Muslim student (permitted to study but observed in the college‟s 
Islamic society), the refugee (afforded the hospitality of the state but biometrically 
identified and risk rated), the British Asian traveler (granted visa waiver but ascribed an 
automated risk score).  
 
Thus, the emergent geography of a twisted and conjoined figure of inside and outside, 
where “one does not know on which face of the strip one is located” (Bigo 2001: 115). 
For Didier Bigo, this is a spatiality of the policing of multiple and variant lines between 
self and other, an “everyday securitization from the enemy within” (2001: 112). Here the 
architecture of enmity becomes the means of securitization itself, such that the distinction 
between „real‟ war (with accompanying visceral violence and bloodshed) and the war by 
other means (legitimated by securing against future violence) becomes permeable. The 
network warfare depicted in accounts of a “military-industrial-media-entertainment 
(MIME) complex”, where “information is no longer a subsidiary of war”, extends the 
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stealthy war-like practices “more widely and deeply into our everyday lives (Der Derian 
2002; see also Dillon and Reid 2007). Consider, for example, the Oracle Corporation‟s 
software, already ubiquitous in our lives, providing IT platforms for payroll, pensions, 
health care, the bibliographic searches used in academic research, and so on. Their 
algorithmic security systems - Non-Obvious Relationship Awareness (NORA) software – 
developed for the entertainment industry and used in the Las Vegas casinos – are now 
deployed by the US Justice and federal intelligence agencies for counter-terror. 
According to Oracle consultants, NORA enables clients to identify “obscure relationships 
between customers, employees, vendors, and other internal and external data sources”. 
NORA searches for behaviour patterns or personal associations that hint at terrorist 
activity, turning data into actionable intelligence” (IDC 2004: 11). 
 
The association rules of the algorithm claim precisely to identify associations, to connect 
together here and there, to link that location of suspicion and this embodied risk, to 
suture together the forces of war in one place and the possibility of threat in the spaces of 
everyday life. In essence, as it traverses the spheres of commerce and consumption, 
transportation, military strategy and state surveillance, the algorithm simultaneously 
conceals the architecture of enmity through which it functions. Giving the appearance of 
an advanced security decision based on the technical and scientific computation of norms 
and deviations from norm, beneath its skin the algorithm contains all of the categories, 
codes and measures that we see in other violent geographies – the racial profiles 
embedded within biometric facial measures, the ethnic or religious practices flagged as 
anomalous in air passenger data, the identification of risk by algorithmic screening of 
name or address. These are the more subtle violences of science and state that are not 
measured by a linear experience of harm, but instead attach themselves to daily prosaic 
practices, limiting the possibilities for life, of life itself (Das and Kleinman 2000).  
 
 
Locatability/Security: Sensors at the Border and in the Supply Chain 
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In August 2004, the US Department for Homeland Security (DHS) announced the testing 
of a new tracking technology at five US land border ports of entry. The trial – conducted 
by consultants Accenture and Deloitte in collaboration with Philips Semiconductors – 
embedded radio frequency identification (RFID) tags into paper I-94 customs and border 
protection forms.
4
 The RFID tags contain a „passive‟ chip and antenna, capable of 
transmitting a unique numeric identifier to a remote reader. By October 2006, though 
rejected for US passports, the same RFID technology became a US entry requirement for 
visa waiver programme passports. Later the same year, the UK‟s Transport for London 
announced that its RFID-enabled Oyster travel payment card was to integrate with a Visa 
credit card, allowing the tracking and tracing of all small transactions, actions and 
movements on the London Underground system. 
 
How might we understand what is at work here? A virtually invisible technology, 
concealed within a paper document or „smart‟ card, is deployed with the precise purpose 
of rendering a person visible, identifiable and locatable. As architect Dana Cuff has 
noted, “there is an irony here”, it is “invisible, miniaturized sensors that are making 
formerly inaccessible realms visible” (2003: 45). In part, of course, the apparent 
invisibility of the techniques for making visible is assured because of their already 
existing ubiquity in everyday commercial transactions. As the Vice President of Philips 
Semiconductors had testified to the US Congress Committee on Energy and Commerce in 
2004, “consumers are already likely to encounter RF-enabled personal identification 
devices in their daily lives, such as secure access cards for building entry, speedy 
gasoline purchasing such as the Exxon Speedpass, vehicle anti-theft systems, and in 
transportation systems all over the world” (US House of Representatives 2004: 3). What 
is taking place, then, is the redeployment of sensor technologies used in the commercial 
tracking of mobile things, objects, animals and vehicles into the domain of the tracking of 
mobile people. 
 
As a technology of location, tracking is central to the processes and practices of 
militarization. As performance artist and social theorist Jordan Crandall has argued, 
“militarization and movement intersect through the activity of tracking” (2005: 19). The 
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domains of geopolitics and geoeconomics cross over here (see Cowen and Smith, this 
issue) as the governing of the global economy draws into common assemblage with a 
state that is concerned to make visible the minutiae of daily life, to seek security in the 
transactions, journeys and movements that are the norm and those that are suspicious. Put 
simply, algorithmic war requires a target for its calculations, preferably a moving target. 
The practice of tracking, then, seeks to “detect, process and strategically codify a moving 
phenomenon in a competitive theatre”, whether this space is a “battlefield, the social 
arena, or the marketplace” (Crandall 2006: 4). In this sense, tracking technologies enable 
the identification and location of moving targets. In the war on terror, the specific form 
has become what Samuel Weber calls a “target of opportunity”, a competitive “seizing” 
of “targets that were not foreseen or planned” (2005: 4). The targets of opportunity in the 
war on terror, then, involve the depiction of mobile enemies: 
 
However different the war on terror was going to be from traditional wars, with 
their relatively well-defined enemies, it would still involve one of the basic 
mechanisms of traditional hunting and combat, in however modified and 
modernized a form: namely “targeting”. The enemy would have to be identified 
and localized, named and depicted, in order to be made into an accessible target… 
None of this was, per se, entirely new. What was, however, was the mobility, 
indeterminate structure, and unpredictability of the spatio-temporal medium in 
which such targets had to be sited… In theatres of conflict that had become highly 
mobile and changeable, “targets” and “opportunity” were linked as never before. 
 (Weber 2005: 3-4, emphasis in original). 
 
Samuel Weber‟s key point of discussion is the theatre of war, though his argument sheds 
significant light on the algorithmic wars on terror that I depict here. The identification, 
localization, naming and depiction of mobile targets is, in this war by other means, 
conducted in and through daily life, in advance of any possible future strike or 
intervention. The targeting of mobile bodies, things, objects or monies is becoming a 
matter of locating – positioning in the sights, if you like – so that the opportunities of a 
mobile global economy might be seized, while the capability to take out the target 
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remains. “Freedom is nothing but the correlative of the deployment of apparatuses of 
security”, states Foucault, “the very possibility of movement, change of place, and 
processes of circulation of both people and things” (2007: 49). For this reason, the 
geography of algorithmic war is a spatiality of locatability in movement, with origins in 
the interplay between military logistics and the commercial logistics of tracking objects 
through a supply chain. As consultants Accenture, Deloitte, IBM and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers lead the drive for multiple networked public and private 
applications of technologies of location such as RFID, the commercial “targets of 
opportunity” that allowed the production of goods to become dispersed and diffuse are 
clearing space for more diffuse modes of sovereign power. The technologies that have 
made possible a global supply chain of export processing zones and offshore sites, are 
simultaneously being embedded into border crossing cards, visas, passports and 
immigrant ID cards that include mobile people within governable space by means of their 
targeted exclusion.  
 
How has locatability emerged as a key means of tracking mobile targets? The emergence 
of knowledges of location, what Nigel Thrift has called “our conventions of address”, 
follows a tacit and often unacknowledged sense that we somehow know “what will show 
up where and what will show up next” (2004: 176). In other words, a system of address 
has been central to our ability to spatially and temporally locate events, objects, people 
and so on. The history of addressability displays a significant playing back and forth of 
military logistical knowledges and commercial supply and transportation knowledges. 
Thus, for example, the origins of 1940s bar code technologies lie in the communication 
techniques of Morse code. Historical records of early bar code techniques describe a 
graduate student, Joseph Woodland, marking the dots and dashes of Morse code into the 
sand on a beach as he thought through a research problem of how to identify a product at 
a check-out (Shepherd 2004: 13). Extending the dots and dashes to two-dimensional wide 
and narrow lines in the sand, Woodland later successfully patented the first binary 
barcode system.  
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As computing technologies began to enable the electronic reading and recognition of 
patterns, new relationships between the identifier (postal code, ZIP, barcode, personal 
identifiers such as date of birth) and the identified (people, places, parcels, vehicles..) 
become possible. Consider, for example, IBM‟s „punch cards‟ of the 1950s, patterns of 
punched holes in a card to be fed into the pattern recognition programmes of IBM 
machines.
5
 The “patterns of data on the IBM cards”, writes architect Reinhold Martin, 
“made visible what was invisible” (2003: 158). The machine‟s ability to „read‟ the cards 
extended beyond the mere processing of data and into the almost magical realm of 
animating a life unseen. In a 1955 publicity brochure, IBM reminded the American 
public of how their lives were locatable in the traces of actions and transactions left in the 
card and „read‟ by the machine: 
 
IBM first came into your life when your birth was recorded on a punched card. 
From then on many such cards have been compiled, giving a lifetime of history of 
your important decisions and actions. If you went to school, entered a hospital, 
bought a home, paid income tax, got married or purchased an automobile, the 
chances are that permanent records were made of these and other personal stories. 
 (Cited in Martin 2003: 159). 
   
What we begin to see with the intersection of systems of address with systems of 
recognition, or the marrying of addressability and readability, if you like, is a computer-
enabled system of locatability. While even rudimentary systems of address involve 
recognizing identifying markings, whether these are numbers, features of the natural 
landscape, or codes, the computer reading of markings and the recognition of patterns 
makes possible novel forms of location. Here, the emphasis is on a more mobile and agile 
mode of address that does not „stop at the door‟ of delivery, but instead dwells inside, 
making visible, readable and locatable the traces of daily life. With the rise of what Jerry 
Kang and Dana Cuff call “computer addressability”, the fixed location of the address is 
loosened via “unique identification codes” (2005: 94). Because the codes dwell inside a 
body or object in the physical environment, they do, at least in theory, make it locatable 
in movement. 
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In this shift from addressability to locatability, the ability to track and trace mobility is 
achieved by animating the physical environment so that it is able to “respond directly to 
what it sees” (Kang and Cuff 2005: 94). Thus, the „reader‟ of traces, markings or 
transactions, established via the early technologies of punch cards and barcodes, becomes 
ever more important to the system of location as “addresses move with human and non-
human actants” (Thrift 2004: 183). Rather as IBMs early computers inferred people‟s life 
histories from the patterns punched into the cards, and from the intervals between them, 
contemporary readers of location, as a group of researchers at Intel have put it: “infer 
people‟s actions from their effect on the environment, especially on the objects with 
which they interact” (Smith et al. 2005: 39). The embedding of RFID tags into objects, as 
Smith and his colleagues have shown at Intel, can be understood as one means to achieve 
a novel and mobile form of targeting. 
 
The origins of contemporary RFID technology, perhaps unsurprisingly, also find some 
roots in military communications and logistics, with the earliest writings on the problem 
to be found in research by radio engineers seeking more efficient readability of signals 
(Stockman 1948). It should be clear, then, that we cannot say that contemporary security 
applications of RFID are simply drawing on commercial knowledges of location. The 
1940s research was, in many ways, the precedent for contemporary RFID technologies 
that deploy miniature tags, emitting a radio signal with a unique numeric identifier that 
can be received by a reader up to 25 feet away (Borriello 2005). Composed of a silicon 
chip and coiled antenna, usually sandwiched inside a plastic tag, so called „passive‟ 
RFIDs use the power supply from the reader to send their signal and are, therefore, 
smaller and require closer proximity to the reader than „active‟ tags that carry their own 
power supply. For example, a passive RFID application such as a supermarket loyalty 
card that is read at the till is, in effect, inert until it is in range of the reader that activates 
it. Once in range of the reader, the RFID‟s numeric identifier allows the reader to locate 
the tag and to associate data on past readings of transactions. For a supermarket shopper‟s 
„loyalty card‟ this might include patterns of past purchases, coupons or vouchers for 
savings and such like. For a US-Mexico border crossing card holder, the passive tag 
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signals an identifier that can be mapped across past patterns of travel, criminal 
convictions or terrorist watch lists. In this way, the RFID identifies the target for 
algorithmic calculation, at the border, at the supermarket check-out, at the entrance to the 
sports stadium, in the subway ticket hall. “Through RFID tags”, as Jerry Kang and Dana 
Cuff have it, address is specified “to a fine level of granularity, much finer than a zip 
code”, so that we “will likely authenticate our identity to multiple queries of „who are 
you‟ made by the enacted environment” (2005: 106).  
 
What are the implications of mobile forms of locatability for algorithmic war and, in 
particular, for the exercise of sovereign power? As RFID stands on the brink of replacing 
bar code and paper-based markers of location (I 94 forms, passports, train tickets, paper 
money at toll booths, tickets for sports events),
6
 how does the war on terror become 
enmeshed with the geographies of everyday life? To be clear here, the seizing of targets 
of opportunity by commercial players can in no sense be interpreted as transcending the 
nation-state or outsourcing state security decisions to the market. Rather, a logic of 
outsourcing and targeting that exceeds any specific public or private domain – that is, as 
Samuel Weber suggests, a “militarization of thinking” – works to sustain the “hyphen” in 
the imagination of nation-state differently (Sparke 2005: 48). It does so, I will argue here, 
via a spatial and temporal deferral of security decision that follows the dispersed 
geography of the commercial supply chain. 
 
The state‟s ability to track and trace people or objects in movement, across or beyond its 
borders, is increasingly bound up with commercial techniques for tracking and tracing 
objects through the supply chain. The paradox of security and mobility – the problematic 
of the moving target – is given the appearance of being fixed by technologies of 
locatability. As David Campbell writes, “were it possible to bring about the absence of 
movement”, that would represent “pure security”, yet it would be at that moment that 
“the state would wither away” (1992: 12). The question is not one of how to arrest 
mobility, then, but how to govern mobility in such a way as to allow circulation and to 
sustain the impression of securability. Put simply, to secure the sovereign power of the 
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state in a global economy of mobile things and people precisely by means of targeting 
bodies in movement. 
 
The contemporary decentred state shares much of its spatial character with the diffuse 
and dispersed capillaries of global capital. If William Connolly (2005: 148) is correct and 
sovereignty is “migrating to a layered global assemblage”, then one aspect of this 
layering is the profusion of ambiguous locations of many kinds, where the distinctions 
between legality and illegality, work and violence, onshore and offshore are increasingly 
blurred. Just as the dispersal of a global supply chain into offshore sites and export 
processing zones permits the deferral of many kinds of commercial decision – at least in 
terms of Jacques Derrida‟s sense of decision as responsibility (1995: 25) – so the 
diffusion of state authority into ambiguous locations of many kinds appears to institute 
the deferral of decision on behalf of the state. In the marketplace that is the test laboratory 
for RFID applications, for example, the tagging at item level by Wal-Mart, M&S and 
Gillette has allowed these commercial players to seek efficient locations in distant places, 
and yet to sustain the ability to control with precision (Eckfeldt 2005). The very idea of 
an animated supply chain, making its own algorithmic calculations and judgements – 
from “smart refrigerators” to smart supermarket shelving and tracked shipments (Günther 
and Spiekerman 2005) – incorporates the bodies and objects of production and 
consumption, from the growers, pickers and producers of raw materials, through 
manufacturing, supply and retail workers.  
 
In the most vulnerable offshore spaces of the global economy, where commercial firms 
seek only the most fleeting of finger holds in a specific territorial space, we begin to see 
how the commercial targeting of things and objects plays into and through the targeting 
of people. Thailand‟s export processing zones – or „free zones‟ – for example, have 
become “e-free-zones”, using RFID to track the movement of imported materials, 
deliveries, exported goods, and, significantly, the bodies of workers, as they traverse the 
boundaries of the zone. The fortified security fences associated with export processing 
zones, then, are augmented by equally carceral, but less obviously visible, lines that track 
and trace the movements of workers via “contactless” smart cards, and the mobility of 
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objects via RF enabled smart labels. Similarly, the extension of RFID into border 
crossing cards and immigration documents allows the feigned impression of an open 
world, while it institutes new lines and boundaries. There is a growing resonance, then, 
between apparently geo-economic systems of locatability (of course always also political) 
that target the bodies of workers and the movement of the objects with which they 
interact, and the algorithmic security practices of the state:  
 
It plays out in new systems of production that aim to narrow the intervals between 
conception, manufacturing, distribution and consumption – shrinking the delays 
between detecting an audience pattern and formatting a new enticement that can 
address it. It plays out in pre-emptive policing and warfare systems that aim to 
close the gap between sensing and shooting. 
 (Crandall 2006: 13). 
 
As Jordan Crandall depicts the geographies of tracking and targeting, they play in and out 
of the plural spaces of our world. As the commercial tracking technologies enter the 
sphere of security – RFID passports, „smart‟ national ID cards, RF-enabled immigration 
and visa documents, the tagging of detained asylum seekers, employee „contactless‟ 
buildings access cards – they defer security decisions into algorithmic calculation. The 
participation of RFID in violent geographies is thus often obscured. When global 
consultants Accenture made their successful bid for the USVISIT „Smart Borders‟ 
contract, for example, they simulated the ability of RFID to target from a distance: 
 
Using a nearby facility belonging to Raytheon, a subcontractor on its team, the 
Accenture team constructed a mock border point kiosk at which the government 
team had an RFID tag attached to their passports. They also constructed a mock 
land border crossing where a scanner read the RFID passport tags of the 
government officials inside the car. Even though the car became momentarily 
airborne after hitting a speed bump – the scanner read the digital information 
contained on the RFID chips of all four government officials in the vehicle, 
displaying their pictures on an electronic billboard as they passed by. 
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 (Accenture 2005: 242, emphasis added).     
      
Accenture‟s business partner Raytheon, the world‟s largest manufacturer of so-called 
„smart weapons‟, produces the cluster bombs widely reported to be responsible for the 
violent deaths of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here we see the targeting of markets 
and neighbourhoods by military hardware segueing into the targeting of people at border 
crossings and in the spaces of the airport. Indeed, it is Raytheon that, in November 2007, 
was awarded the £650 million UK e-borders contract as the leading contractor of the 
Trusted Borders consortium, with Accenture the IT systems subcontractor. Where RFID 
appears to render movement around the subways, highways and superstores of the global 
economy as a smooth and seamless experience, it does so by aligning the security 
practices of the state with the mobilities of the consumer. In this sense, our everyday 
geographies do spiral into and across the daily violences of the algorithmic targeting of 
„others‟ and the visceral military violence of bombing campaigns.  
 
It is important to recognise at this point that we can only gain a limited understanding of 
the technologies of algorithmic war by seeing them as explainable by the post 9/11 
deepening of political economies of surveillance (Lyon 2003). The capacity of RFID to 
make us locatable is actually acutely ambivalent: we feel its potential to watch and to 
incarcerate just as we simultaneously feel it fulfil some of our desires and pleasures. As 
Matt Sparke has illustrated in his study of the biometric proximity cards used in the US-
Canadian border NEXUS programme, the appeal is made to “the fast lane, where you 
want to be” (2006: 167). Similarly, RFID is offered as a means of expediting mobility in 
the UK‟s Heathrow airport “MiSense” programme, promising to “simplify your journey 
through the airport while maintaining security”.7 The MiSense programme, by 
incorporating smart sensors into the possession of the subject – „my sense‟ – invites an 
almost playful encounter with RFID sensors. This stitching together of playful leisurely 
RFID encounters with security practice asks the subject to voluntarily offer themselves 
up to tracking technologies in return for expedited movement. In some of the most 
playful forms of RFID use in the leisure industry – subcutaneous chips inserted into the 
arms of customers at a Glasgow nightclub so that they may pay for their drinks without 
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the hindrance of cash or cards; RFID golf balls that communicate their location to a 
remote reader – we can see security dreams fulfilled. Night club patrons secure their pre-
cleared identity and financial details beneath their skin, and golfers seek out a means of 
securely locating distant objects. Where RFID “pleasures and anxieties cohabit”, the 
targeted line of sight sorts and segregates finite degrees of visibility so that, for some, 
“the edges are smoothed” as they “blend seamlessly into the crowd” (Crandall 2006: 12). 
For others, of course, the line of sight targets for heightened exposure to visibility – to 
stop and search, to continually verify identity, to have movement in public space checked 
and intercepted.  
 
 
Conclusions: Securability and Algorithmic War 
 
You won‟t get by the booth… You look too young to be driving out of state”… 
But there is nobody in the booth built to hold a toll-taker. Nobody. A green light 
flashes E-Z PASS PAID and Ahmad and the white truck are admitted to the 
tunnel. 
(Updike 2006: 298). 
 
In a final scene of John Updike‟s novel Terrorist, the protagonist Ahmad drives his truck 
bomb to the entrance of the Manhattan-bound Lincoln tunnel. His passenger and reluctant 
mentor, Jack Levy, urges him that the security guard will detain him on the grounds that 
he looks too young to have a state license permitting him to drive out of state. At the 
boundary line of the city, Levy feels sure, their fatal journey will be halted, their 
movement intercepted. What Levy does not anticipate is the RFID transponder on the 
windshield of the truck, sending a signal to the barrier reader, algorithmically calculating 
– is the truck licensed?; is the toll pre-paid?; has the vehicle been reported stolen? The 
calculation is made, a green light flashes and the truck enters the tunnel.  
 
In Updike‟s novel, the practices of homeland securitization are revealed in all their 
contingency and unpredictability (asked by his wife what the Homeland Security 
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department‟s elevation of threat from yellow to orange means, Levy replies “It means 
they want us to feel they have a handle on this thing, but they don‟t”). The algorithmic 
technologies, so readily established at the forefront of the securitization of borders and 
boundaries of many kinds, are revealed in Updike‟s novel to be intrinsic to the feigning 
of securability. The point here is that we know not, in any meaningful sense, what 
algorithmic war will do beyond giving the impression that things/people/commodities can 
be secured against an imagined enemy. It could have been the case – had the association 
rules shown the white truck to be on a watch list database, or the E-Z Pass to be expired, 
or had a previous transaction flagged a risk – that the algorithm signalled a red light and 
the movement of the truck would have been intercepted. Yet, these are the contingencies 
of the relationship of the algorithmic calculation to the actual everyday geographies they 
seek to model and simulate. These are the unknowns, the indeterminacies of algorithmic 
war. 
 
The question, then, is how to open up these contingencies and ambiguities in order to 
politicize what would otherwise be a highly technologized set of moves. “Uncertainty 
and unpredictability can be unsettling”, writes Jenny Edkins, “in the rational west, we 
tend to seek certainty and security above all. We don‟t like not knowing. So we pretend 
that we do” (2003a: 12). The algorithmic war I have described here – with its dividing 
geographies of us/them, safe/risky – is precisely one means by which we “pretend that we 
do”. Algorithmic logics appear to make it possible to translate probable associations 
between people and objects into actionable security decisions, or to incorporate the 
uncertain future into the present. The practices of this war by other means, then, are 
themselves productive of quite specific pre-emptive forms of war and violence. Though 
the everyday geographies of this „other‟ war on terror are partially militarizing, in the 
sense of drawing military practice more closely into proximity with everyday life, they 
are more meaningfully drawing on a militarization of thinking that is co-present in 
corporate calls for risk targets and the riding out of uncertainty, in state drives to target, 
track and trace people and objects, and in the suspicions and prejudices of an enlisted 
vigilant public. 
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NOTES 
1
 Among the 34 items of passenger data required under the EU-US passenger name record (PNR) or 
Advance passenger information system (APIS) agreement, legally challenged by the European Court of 
Justice in 2006, are credit card details, criminal records and in-flight meal choices. The data is extradited to 
the US within 15 minutes of flight departures from Europe (Guild and Brouwer 2006). 
2
 In 2005, London‟s Metropolitan Police launched a public vigilance campaign, „If you suspect it, report it‟, 
that has now been extended across the UK. The campaign urges people to report “suspicions about 
somebody‟s behaviour” to an anti-terrorist hotline (Metropolitan Police 2005). 
3
 The call centre operator will ask the caller questions about the nature of the suspicion, generating a risk 
profile from the associations between different items of information – how many trains have passed the 
platform?; what type of clothing?; carrying a bag?; alone or accompanied?  (insights from confidential 
interview conducted London, November 2006). 
4
 The green paper I-94 documents are familiar to visa waiver citizens as the declarations completed on 
airline flights to the United States. 
5
 IBM‟s generation of punch-card computers used technology derived from Herman Hollerith‟s patterned 
cards developed for the US census of 1890, itself having roots in pattern cards used in weaving (Hacking 
1990: 53). The IBM Hollerith technologies and techniques were used in the Nazi death camps to identify 
individuals and to track the „transports‟. After the War, Hollerith machines were also deployed by the Red 
Cross to trace survivors. 
6
 At an electronics conference in San Francisco in February 2006, researchers from Philips‟ laboratories in 
the Netherlands announced their new RFID chips with plastic in place of silicon semi-conductors. 
According to Science News, the replacement of silicon “brings closer the prospect of RFID tags becoming 
as common as bar codes, or perhaps even more so as plastic tags make novel electronic tracking and 
transactions possible, from computer monitoring of what is in the refrigerator to mail routing by means of 
smart address labels” (2006: 1). 
7
 Full text of the miSense programme is available at www.misense.org, last accessed December 2006. 
